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Abstract
We provide revealed preference axioms that characterize models of translation invari-
ant preferences. In particular, we characterize the models of variational, maxmin, CARA
and CRRA utilities. In each case we present a revealed preference axiom that is satis-
fied by a dataset if and only if the dataset is consistent from the corresponding utility
representation. Our results complement traditional exercises in decision theory that take
preferences as primitive.
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1 Introduction
We work out the testable implications of models with translation invariant preferences.
Given a finite dataset on purchases of state-contingent assets, we give a revealed pref-
erence axiom that describes the datasets that are consistent with different models of
translation invariant preferences.
These models include risk neutral variational preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006),
risk neutral maxmin preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), and subjective expected
utility preferences with constant absolute risk aversion: so-called CARA preferences.
Analogously to the CARA case, we also work out the testable implications of subjective
expected utility preferences with constant relative risk aversion, the CRRA preferences
(these form the “homothetic” class alluded to in the title). The models have been used
by economists for different purposes. Variational and maxmin preferences are the most
commonly-used models of ambiguity aversion. They are also used to capture model
robustness (Hansen and Sargent, 2008). CARA and CRRA preferences are very common
in applied work in macroeconomics and finance, among other fields.
Our contribution is to start from finite data on state-contingent consumption pur-
chases, such as one would observe from a market experiment on choice under uncertainty
(Hey and Pace, 2014; Ahn et al., 2014; Bayer et al., 2012; Bossaerts et al., 2010). We
∗We are very grateful to Simon Grant and Massimo Marinacci, who posed questions to us that led
to some of the results in this paper.
describe the datasets that are rationalizable as consistent with a preference relation that
satisfies translation invariance. When we say that we describe the datasets that are ra-
tionalizable, we mean that we provide a property, a “revealed preference axiom,” that
the data satisfies if and only if it is consistent with the theory in question.
The models we study have well known axiomatizations when one takes preferences
as primitive, but not when one takes consumption data as given. The axiomatization of
variational preferences is due to Maccheroni et al. (2006) (see also Grant and Polak (2013)
for a variation on their arguments). The axiomatization of maxmin is due to Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). These papers are often thought to provide the behavioral counterpart
of certain theories of choice: the preference relation captures an agent’s behavior, and
the theorems in these papers describe the behaviors that are consistent with the theory.
Our focus is on behavior in the market, not on preferences. The primitive is a finite list
of purchases of state-contingent payments, each one made at a different price vector.
In contrast with most papers on ambiguity, we do not work in the Anscombe-Aumann
framework. For this reason, we must restrict attention to risk-neutral variational and
maxmin preferences. The Anscombe-Aumann framework has the advantage that it (es-
sentially) allows the utility over outcome to be observable. In a similar vein, our results
extend beyond the risk neutral case by adding a utility function as an “observation” to
our datasets.
It would of course be desirable to obtain results without the assumption of risk neu-
trality; but these are likely difficult to come by. One exception is the case of maxmin
utility with two states: we give a characterization of the data sets that are rationalizable
with risk neutral (concave utility over money) maxmin in Section 6. The two-state case
is of course restrictive, but probably of interest for experiments on ambiguity: some of
the most basic experiments illustrating ambiguity aversion involve two states.
The closest papers to ours are Varian (1988), Bayer et al. (2012) and Polisson and
Quah (2013). Our results on CARA and CRRA are close to Varian (1988). The main
difference is that Varian considers the case of objective probabilities, not subjective.
Bayer et al. (2012) and Polisson and Quah (2013) looks at the testable implications of
models of ambiguity aversion for the same kinds of data that we assume in this paper.
They give a characterization in terms of the solution of a system of inequalities. Our
contribution is different because we give a revealed preference axiom that has to be
satisfied for the data to be rationalizable.
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The papers by Kubler et al. (2014) and Echenique and Saito (2013) are also related.
Kubler et al. solves the same problem as we do here, but for the case of expected utility
theory with known (objective) probabilities over states. Echenique and Saito solve the
problem for subjective expected utility.
2 Definitions.
Let S be a finite set of states of the world. An act is a function from S into <. So <S
is the set of acts. An act can be interpreted as a state-contingent monetary payment.
Define ‖x‖1 =
∑
s xs.
A preference relation on <S is a binary relation  that is complete and transitive.
Given a preference relation, we denote by the strict part of. A function u : <S → <
defines a preference relation  by x  y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y). We say that u
represents , or that it is a utility function for .
A preference relation  on <S is locally nonsatiated if for every x and every  > 0
there is y such that x− y <  and y  x.
3 Preferences, utilities, and data.
A data set D is a finite collection {(pk, xk)}Kk=1, where each pk ∈ <S++ is a vector of
strictly positive (Arrow-Debreu) prices, and each xk ∈ <S is an act. The interpretation
of a dataset is that each pair (pk, xk) consists of an act xk chosen from the budget
{x ∈ <S : pk · x ≤ pk · xk} of affordable acts.1
A data set {(pk, xk)}Kk=1 is rationalizable by a preference relation  if xk  x whenever
pk · xk ≥ pk · x. So a data set is rationalizable by a preference relation when the choices
in the dataset would have been optimal for that preference relation.
A data set {(pk, xk)}Kk=1 is rationalizable by a utility function u if it is rationalizable
by the preference relation represented by u. So a data set is rationalizable by a utility
1Arrow-Debreu prices make sense in a setting of complete markets and absence of arbitrage. Arrow-
Debreu prices can then be recovered from asset prices. We also imagine experimental data from markets
in which Arrow-Debreu securities are traded (Hey and Pace, 2014; Ahn et al., 2014; Bayer et al., 2012).
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function when the choices in the dataset would have maximized that utility function in
the relevant budget set.
A preference relation  is translation invariant if for all x, y ∈ <S and all c ∈ <, we
have x  y if and only if x+ (c, . . . , c)  y + (c, . . . , c).
A preference relation  is homothetic if for all x, y ∈ <S and all α > 0, we have x  y
if and only if αx  αy.
A preference  is a (risk-neutral) variational preference if there is a convex and
continuous function c such that the utility function
inf
pi∈∆(S)
pi · x+ c(pi)
represents . If a data set is rationalizable by a variational preference relation, we will
say that the dataset set is (risk-neutral) variational-rationalizable.
A special case of variational preference is maxmin: A preference relation is (risk-
neutral) maxmin if there is a closed and convex set Π ⊆ ∆(S) such that the utility
function
inf
pi∈Π
pi · x
represents . If a data set is rationalizable by a risk neutral maxmin preference relation,
we will say that the dataset set is (risk-neutral) maxmin-rationalizable.
A utility u : <S → < is constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) if there is a > 0 and
pi ∈ ∆(S) for which
u(x) =
∑
s∈S
pis (− exp(−ax)) .
Note that CARA is a special case of subjective expected utility.
A utility u : <S → < is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) if there is a ∈ (0, 1)
and pi ∈ ∆(S) for which
u(x) =
∑
s∈S
pis
(
x1−a
1− a
)
.
If a data set is rationalizable by a CARA (CRRA) utility, we will say that the dataset
set is CARA (CRRA) rationalizable.
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4 Variational preferences
We present the results on variational and maxmin rationalizability as Theorems 1 and 3.
In each case, the model in question assumes a linear utility index: so the model captures
ambiguity aversion but risk neutrality. These results beg the question of the empirical
content of risk aversion together with ambiguity aversion. In Section 6 we present a result
on maxmin utility with risk aversion. It is restricted to environments with two states.
1 Theorem. The following statements are equivalent:
1. Dataset D is rationalizable by a locally nonsatiated, translation invariant preference.
2. Dataset D is rationalizable by a continuous, strictly increasing, concave utility func-
tion satisfying the property u(x+ (c, . . . , c)) = u(x) + c.
3. Dataset D is variational-rationalizable.
4. For every l = 1, . . . ,M , and every sequence {kl} ⊆ {1, . . . , K}, we have
∑M
l=1
pkl
‖pkl‖1 ·
(xkl+1 − xkl) ≥ 0 (here addition is modulo M , as usual).
2 Remark. The preceding result can be generalized. Suppose we were interested in the
testable implications of preferences which are β-translation invariant, for some β ≥ 0,
β 6= 0. That is, we want to know whether for all x, y, we have x  y if and only if
x + β  y + β. Define the seminorm ‖x‖β1 =
∑
i |βixi|. Then it is an easy exercise to
verify that the testable implications of β-translation invariance are given by equation (4),
replacing ‖ · ‖1 with ‖ · ‖β1 . Hence, the test given here should be compared with the one
given by Brown and Calsamiglia (2007), and other tests for risk preferences.
We now turn out attention to maxmin preferences. Note that the equivalence be-
tween (2) and (3) in Theorem 3 is well known, but here we prove it through an application
of Theorem 1.
We say that a function u : <S → < is linearly homogeneous if for all x ∈ <S and all
α > 0, we have u(αx) = αu(x).
3 Theorem. The following statements are equivalent:
1. Dataset D is rationalizable by a locally nonsatiated, homothetic and translation
invariant preference.
2. Dataset D is rationalizable by a continuous, strictly increasing, linearly homoge-
neous and concave utility function satisfying the property that u(x + (c, . . . , c)) =
u(x) + c.
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3. Dataset D is maxmin-rationalizable.
4. For every k and l,
pk
‖pk‖1 · x
k ≤ p
l
‖pl‖1 · x
k.
5 CARA and CRRA
The previous section considers translation invariance and homotheticity as general prop-
erties of preferences in choice under uncertainty. Here we focus on the case of subjective
expected utility. So we consider models in which the agent has a single prior over states,
and maximizes expected utility. The prior is unknown though, and must be inferred from
her choices. In the subjective expected utility case, translation invariance gives rise to
CARA preferences, and homotheticity to CRRA.
4 Theorem. A dataset D is CARA rationalizable if and only if there is ∗ > 0 such
that (1) holds; and CRRA rationalizable if and only if there is ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that (2)
holds.
∗(xkt − xks + xk
′
s − xk
′
t ) = ln(
pks
pkt
pk
′
t
pk′s
) (1)
∗ ln(
xkt
xks
xk
′
s
xk
′
t
) = ln(
pks
pkt
pk
′
t
pk′s
) (2)
The conditions in Theorem 4 may look like existential conditions: essentially Afriat in-
equalities. Afriat inequalities are indeed the source of equations (1) and (2), as evidenced
by the proof of Theorem 4, but note that the statements are equivalent to non-existential
statements. Equation (1) says that when (xkt − xks + xk′s − xk′t ) 6= 0,
ln(p
k
s
pkt
pk
′
t
pk′s
)
(xkt − xks + xk′s − xk′t )
is independent of k, t, k′ and s; and that when (xkt −xks+xk′s −xk′t ) = 0 then ln(p
k
s
pkt
pk
′
t
pk′s
) = 0.
Similarly for Equation (2).
It is worth pointing out that, except in the case when for all observations, all prices are
equal, and consumption of all goods are equal, equation (1) can have only one solution.
Hence, risk preferences are uniquely identified. The next corollary also shows that beliefs
are identified.
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When pi ∈ ∆(S) and a > 0, let Ua =
∑
s∈S pis (− exp(−ax)) denote the associated
subjective expected CARA utility.
5 Corollary. ∗ > 0 solves (1) if and only if there is pi ∈ ∆(S) such that pi and U∗ CARA
rationalizes D. Further, for any such ∗ > 0, there is a unique pi∗ ∈ ∆(S) such that if pi′
and U∗ CARA rationalizes D, then pi′ = pi. Similarly for (2) and CRRA rationalizability.
6 Risk averse max-min with two states
The prior result is about risk neutral maxmin. Here we turn to maxmin with risk aversion.
A preference relation is maxmin if there is a closed and convex set Π ⊆ ∆(S) and a
concave utility u : <S → < such that the utility function
inf
pi∈Π
∑
s=1,2
pisu(xs)
represents . If a data set is rationalizable by a maxmin preference relation, we will say
that the dataset set is maxmin-rationalizable.
Assume a dataset {(pk, xk)}Kk=1 in which xks 6= xk′s′ when (k, s) 6= (k′, s′).
Let K1 be the set of all k such that x
k
1 < x
k
2, and K2 be the set of all k such that
xk1 > x
k
2. Suppose that K = K1 ∪K2.
Given a sequence of pairs (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1, consider the following notation: Let Il,s =
i : ki ∈ Kl and si = s I ′l,s = i : k′i ∈ K ′l and s′i = s, for l = 1, 2 and s = 1, 2.
1 (Strong Axiom of Revealed Maxmin Utility (SARMU)): For any sequence of pairs
(xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 in which
1. xkisi ≥ x
k′i
s′i
for all i;
2. each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears
as k′i (on the right);
3. I1,1 − I ′1,1 = I ′2,1 − I2,1 ≤ 0
The product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
≤ 1.
7
One can alternatively define the axiom with I2,2−I ′2,2 = I ′1,2−I1,2 ≤ 0 in condition (3).
6 Theorem. A dataset is maxmin rationalizable if and only if it satisfies SARMU.
6.1 Discussion
Echenique and Saito (2013) show that the following axiom characterizes rationalizability
by subjective expected utility.
2 (Strong Axiom of Revealed Subjective Expected Utility (SARSEU)): For any sequence
of pairs (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 in which
1. xkisi ≥ x
k′i
s′i
for all i;
2. each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears
as k′i (on the right);
3. I1,1 + I2,1 = I
′
1,1 + I
′
2,1
The product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
≤ 1.
Note that condition (3) of SARSEU is equivalent to I2,2 + I1,2 = I
′
2,2 + I
′
1,2 because
I1,1 + I2,1 + I2,2 + I1,2 = n = I
′
1,1 + I
′
2,1 + I
′
2,2 + I
′
1,2.
Inspection of SARSEU and SARMU yields the following
7 Proposition. If a dataset satisfies SARSEU then it satisfies SARMU.
For a dataset to be maxmin rationalizable, but inconsistent with subjective expected
utility, it needs to contain a sequence in the conditions of SARSEU in which I1,1 + I2,1 =
I ′1,1 + I
′
2,1, but where I1,1 − I ′1,1 > 0.
As we have emphasized, the result in Theorem 6 is for two states. There are two
simplifications afforded by the assumption of two states, and the two are crucial in
obtaining the theorem. The first is that with two states there are only two extreme priors
to any set of priors. With the assumption that u is monotonic, one can know which of
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the two extremes is relevant to evaluate any given act. The second simplification is a
bit harder to see, but it comes from the fact that one can normalize the probability of
one state to be one and only keep track of the probability of the other state. Then the
property of being an extreme prior carries over to the probability of the state that is left
“free.”2
7 Proofs
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
That (3) =⇒(1) is obvious. We shall first prove that (1) =⇒(4)
Suppose, towards a contradiction, D is a dataset satisfying (1) but not (4). Then we
have a cycle
∑M
l=1
pkl
‖pkl‖1 · (xkl+1 − xkl) < 0. Let us without loss assume the sequence is
x1, . . . , xM so as to avoid cumbersome notation. Let Z =
∑M
l=1
pl
‖pl‖1 · (xl+1 − xl) < 0.
Define a new sequence (y1, . . . , yM) inductively. Let y1 = x1, and let yk = xk +
(ck, . . . , ck) where ck is chosen so that p
k
‖pk‖1 · (yk+1 − yk) = ZM . Specifically, c1 = 0 and
ck+1 = ck +
Z
M
− p
k
‖pk‖1 · (x
k+1 − xk)
for k = 1, . . . ,M − 1. Let qk = pk‖pk‖1 and consider the dataset (qk, yk), k = 1, . . .M .
Observe that
M−1∑
k=1
qk · (yk+1 − yk) + qM · (y1 − yM) =
M∑
k=1
pk
‖pk‖1 · (x
k+1 − xk) = Z,
and that qk · (yk+1− yk) = Z/M for k = 1, . . . ,M − 1. Therefore, qM · (y1− yM) = Z/M
The original dataset is rationalizable by some locally non-satiated and translation
invariant preference . It is easy to see that the same preference rationalizes the dataset
(qk, yk). Indeed, if qk · yk ≥ qk · y then pk · xk ≥ pk · (y − (ck, . . . , ck)), by definition of yk
and qk. So xk  (y − (ck, . . . , ck)), and thus yk  y by translation invariance of .
2This can be seen in the proof of Lemma 8 when we go from p¯i ≥ pi to µ¯1 ≥ µ1.
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Observe that
M−1∑
k=1
qk · (yk+1 − yk) + qM · (y1 − yM) =
M−1∑
k=1
pk
‖pk‖1 · (x
k+1 − xk) + cM = Z,
and that qk · (yk+1− yk) = Z/M for k = 1, . . . ,M − 1. Therefore, qM · (y1− yM) = Z/M .
In particular, qk · (yk+1 − yk) = Z/M < 0 for k = 1, . . . ,M (mod M). Thus yk  yk+1
as (qk, yk) is rationalizable by  and  is locally nonsatiated. This contradicts the
transitivity of .
Now we show that (4) =⇒(2). Let x ∈ <S. Let Σx be the set of all subsequences
{kl}Ml=1 ⊂ {1, . . . , K} for which k1 = 1 and define xkM+1 = x. By (4), if {kl}Ml=1 ∈ Σx has
a cycle (meaning that kl = kl′ for l, l
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} with l 6= l′), then there is a shorter
sequence {kj}M ′j=1 ∈ Σx with
M ′∑
j=1
pkj
‖pkj‖1 · (x
kj+1 − xkj) ≤
M∑
l=1
pkl
‖pkl‖1 · (x
kl+1 − xkl).
Therefore, u(x) = inf{∑Ml=1 pkl‖pkl‖1 · (xkl+1 − xkl) : {kl}Ml=1 ∈ Σx} is well defined, as the
infimum can be taken over a finite set.
That u : <S → < defined in this fashion is concave, strictly increasing and continuous
is immediate. To see that it rationalizes the data, suppose that pk · xl ≤ pk · xk. Then
pk
‖pk‖1 · xl ≤
pk
‖pk‖1 · xk. It is clear then by definition that u(xl) ≤ u(xk) +
pk
‖pk‖1 · (xl− xk) ≤
u(xk).
Finally, to show that u(x) + (c, . . . , c)) = u(x) + c, note that for any pk, we have
pk
‖pk‖1 · (x+ (c, . . . , c)) = c+
pk
‖pk‖1 · x. The result then follows by construction.
We end the proof by showing that (2) =⇒(3) Let u : <S → < be as in the statement
of (2). Define the concave conjugate of u by
f(pi) = inf{pi · x− u(x) : x ∈ <S}
= inf{pi · x+ cpi · 1− u(x)− c : x ∈ <S, c ∈ <}
= inf{pi · x− c(1− pi · 1)− u(x) : x ∈ <S, c ∈ <},
where the second inequality uses that u(x + (c, . . . , c)) = u(x) + c. Now note that
f(pi) = −∞ if (1 − pi · 1) 6= 0. Note also that the monotonicity of u implies that
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f(pi) = −∞ if there is s such that piS < 0. Hence the domain of f is a subset of ∆(S).
Now since u is continuous, we have that u(x) = infpi∈∆(S) pi · x − f(p). Since u
rationalizes the dataset, the dataset is variational rationalizable.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 3
It is obvious that (3) =⇒(2) and that (2) =⇒(1). Hence, to show the theorem, it suffices
to show that (4) implies (3) and that (1) implies (4).
For a dataset D, let pik = p
k
‖pk‖1 . It is easy to see that (4) =⇒(3). Let Π be the convex
hull of {pik : k = 1, . . . , K}. Then it is immediate that U(x) = minpi∈Π pi · x rationalizes
D.
We prove that (1) =⇒(4). Suppose that D satisfies (1) but not (4). Then there is
k and l for which pil · xk < pik · xk. Let  be a preference relation as stated in (1).
Homotheticity implies that  rationalizes the data {(xj, pij) : j = 1, . . . , K} ∪ {(θxl, pil)}
for any scalar θ > 0. Now, pil · xk < pik · xk implies that
xk · (pil − pik) + θxl · (pik − pil) < 0
for θ > 0 small enough. But this is a violation of (4) in Theorem 1. A contradiction
because  is translation invariant and locally nonsatiated.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 4
The idea in the proof is to solve the first-order conditions for the unknown terms. Con-
sider first the case of CARA. Let pi ∈ ∆(S) and α > 0 rationalize D. Then we know
that xk maximizes
∑
s pis − exp(−αxs) subject to pk · x ≤ pk · xk. By considering the
Lagrangean and the first order conditions, we may conclude that for every s, t ∈ S and
every k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we have
pis exp(−αxks)
pks
=
pit exp(−αxkt )
pkt
.
Conclude that p
k
spit
pkt pis
= exp(−α(xks − xkt )). By taking logs, the system becomes:
ln(pis)− ln(pit) + α(xkt − xks) = ln(ps)− ln(pt). (3)
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In the case of CRAA, the existence of a rationalizing pi and parameter imply a
first-order condition of the form
ln(pis)− ln(pit) + α ln(xkt /xks) = ln(ps)− ln(pt). (4)
We can denote ln(pis) by zs in Equations (3) and (4). Thus we obtain that D is
rationalizable if and only if there exist zs ∈ < and α > 0 such that the following equation
is solved for all s, t, k with s 6= t:
zs − zt + α(ykt − yks ) = ln(pks)− ln(pkt ),
where ykt = x
k
t for CARA rationalizability, and y
k
t = lnx
k
t for CRRA rationalizability.
Now the necessity of the axioms is obvious. Let k 6= k′, then
α(ykt − yks )− ln(pks/pkt ) = zs − zt = α(yk
′
t − yk
′
s )− ln(pk
′
s /p
k′
t )
for any s and t. Thus
(ykt − yks − yk
′
t + y
k′
s ) = ln(
pks
pkt
pk
′
t
pk′s
).
So (1) is satisfied for the case of CARA rationalizability, and (2) is satisfied for the case
of CRRA rationalizability.
To prove sufficiency, let
dp(s, t, k) = log(pks/p
k
t )
dx(s, t, k) = yks − ykt .
Let α∗ be such that for all k, k′, s, s′ and t,
∗(ykt − yks − yk
′
t + y
k′
s ) = ln(
pks
pkt
pk
′
t
pk′s
).
Then in particular, for all k, k′, s, s′ and t,
dp(s, t, k) +∗ dx(s, t, k) + dp(t, s, k′) +∗ dx(t, s, k′) = 0. (5)
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Note also that
dp(s, t, k) + dp(t, s′, k) + dp(s′, s, k)
+∗(dx(s, t, k) + dx(t, s′, k) + dx(s′, s, k)) = 0.
(6)
Fix s0 ∈ S and let zs0 ∈ < be arbitrary. For any s ∈ S, define zs by
zs = zs0 +
∗ dx(s0, s, k) + dp(s, s0, k),
for some k. In fact, by Equation (5) this definition is independent of k because dp(s, s0, k)+
∗
dx(s, s0, k) = d
p(s, s0, k
′) +∗ dx(s, s0, k′).
Given this definition, note that
zs − zt =∗ (dx(s0, s, k)− dx(s0, t, k)) + dp(s, s0, k)− dp(t, s0, k)
=∗ (dx(s0, s, k)− dx(s0, t, k)) + dp(s, s0, k)− dp(t, s0, k)
+ dp(s, t, k) + dp(t, s0, k) + d
p(s0, s, k)
+∗ (dx(s, t, k) + dx(t, s0, k) + dx(s0, s, k))
= dp(s, t, k) +∗ dx(s, t, k).
Where the second equality uses Equation (6).
Hence, with the constructed (zt)t∈S we have
zs − zt +∗ (ykt − yks ) = log(pks/pkt ),
for all s, t, and k. The first-order conditions for rationalizability are therefore satisfied.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 6
8 Lemma. A dataset D is rationalizable if and only if there are vks ,
k, s = 1, 2, k =
1, . . . , K, and p¯i, pi ≥ 0 with p¯i ≥ pi, such that:
pivk1 =
k pk1
vk2 =
k pk2,
13
for all k = 1, . . . , K, where pi = p¯i when xk1 < x
k
2 and pi = pi when x
k
1 > x
k
2. The numbers
also satisfy that vks ≤ vk′s′ when xks > xk′s′ .
Proof. To prove sufficiency, let vks ,
k, s = 1, 2, k = 1, . . . , K, and p¯i, pi ≥ 0 with p¯i ≥ pi
be as in the statement of the lemma. Define µ¯, µ ∈ ∆(S) as follows. Let µ¯1 = p¯i/(1 + p¯i)
µ¯2 = 1/(1 + p¯i) and µ1 = pi/(1 + pi) µ2 = 1/(1 + pi) Note that µ¯1 ≥ µ1 and µ¯2 ≤ µ2, as
p¯i ≥ pi. Define θk =k /(1 + p¯i) if xk1 < xk2 and θk =k /(1 + pi) if xk1 > xk2. Then we have
that µsv
k
1 = θ
kpk2, with µs = µ¯s when x
k
1 < x
k
2; and µs = µs when x
k
1 > x
k
2.
Given the numbers vks it is now routine to define a correspondence ρ such that if
x ≤ x′, y ∈ ρ(x) and y′ ∈ ρ(x′) then y ≥ y′ > 0, and with ρ(xks) 3 vks . This gives a
concave and increasing function u with ∂u(c) = ρ(x). So θ
kpks
µs
∈ ∂u(xks) for all (x, s), and
hence the first order conditions are satisfied for maxmin rationalization.
We omit the proof of necessity.
Let A be a matrix with 2K+ 2 +K+ 1 columns, and 2K rows. The first 2K columns
are labeled with a different pair (k, s). The next 2 columns are labeled pi and pi. The
next K columns are labeled with a k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Finally the last column is labeled p.
For each (k, s) with k ∈ K1, A has a row with all zero entries with the following
exception. It has a 1 in the column labeled (k, s), among the first group of 2K columns.
It has a 1 in the column labeled k. In the column labeled p it has − log(pks). Finally, if
s = 1 then it has a 1 in the column labeled p¯i. For each (k, s) with k ∈ K2, A has a row
defined as above. The only difference is that when s = 1 then it has a 1 in the column
labeled pi instead of having one in p¯i.
Let B be a matrix with the same number of columns as A, and one row for each
pair (xks , x
k′
s′ ) with x
k
s > x
k′
s′ . The columns of B are labeled like those of A. The row for
xks > x
k′
s′ has all zeroes except for a 1 in column (k
′, s′) and a −1 in column (k, s). Finally,
B has one more row. This row as a 1 in the column for p¯i and a −1 in the column for pi,
and it is labeled s = 1 for future reference.
Let E be a matrix with the same number of columns as A, labeled as above, and a
single row. The row has all zeroes except for a 1 in column p.
By Lemma 8, there is no rationalizing maxmin preference if and only if there is no
solution to the system of inequalities A · x = 0, B · x ≥ 0 and E · x > 0.
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Suppose that all log(pks) are rational numbers. We shall use the following version
of the Theorem of the Alternative, which can be found as Theorem 1.6.1 in Stoer and
Witzgall (1970).
9 Lemma. Let A be an m× n matrix, B be an l× n matrix, and E be an r× n matrix.
Suppose that the entries of the matrices A, B, and E belong to a commutative ordered
field F. Exactly one of the following alternatives is true.
1. There is u ∈ Fn such that A · u = 0, B · u ≥ 0, E · u 0.
2. There is θ ∈ Fr, η ∈ Fl, and pi ∈ Fm such that θ ·A+ η ·B + pi ·E = 0; pi > 0 and
η ≥ 0.
Then the non-existence of a solution to the system A · x = 0, B · x ≥ 0 and E · x > 0
is equivalent to the existence of integer vectors η, θ and γ such that θ ≥ 0, γ > 0, and
η · A+ θ ·B + γE = 0.
For a matrix D with 2K + 2 + K + 1 columns, let D1 denote the submatrix corre-
sponding to the first 2K columns, D2 correspond to the next 2, D3 to the next K, and
D4 to the last column. Note that, by construction of A, B and E, η ·A+ θ ·B + γE = 0
implies that η · A1 + θ · B1 = 0, η · A2 + θ · B2 = 0, η · A3 = 0, η · A4 + γ = 0. In fact,
we can without loss assume that η, θ and γ take values of −1, 0 or 1. (This assumption
is without loss because we can replace each row of matrices A, B and E with as many
copies as indicated by the corresponding vector η, θ or γ.)
From the existence of such vectors it follows that we can obtain a sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1
with xkisi > x
k′i
s′i
. The source of each pair (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
) is that the column (ki, si) of A is
multiplied by η(ki,si) > 0 and the column (k
′
i, s
′
i) of A is multiplied by η(k′i,s′i) < 0. The
vector η must then have η(ki,si) > 0 and η(k′i,s′i) > 0, with a −1 in the first column and a
1 in the second.
We shall prove that the sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 satisfies the properties stated in the
axiom.
Firstly, η · A3 = 0 means that for each k, the number of is for which k = ki equals
the number of is for which k = k′i.
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Secondly, η · A2 + θ ·B2 = 0 implies that:∑
k∈K1
η(k,1) + θs=1 = 0∑
k∈K2
η(k,1) − θs=1 = 0.
Note that
∑
k∈K1 η(k,1) = {i : ki ∈ K1, s = 1} − {i : k′i ∈ K1, s = 1}, and similarly for∑
k∈K2 η(k,1). Hence,
{i : ki ∈ K1 and si = 1} − {i : k′i ∈ K1 and si = 1}
= {i : k′i ∈ K2 and si = 1} − {i : ki ∈ K2 and si = 1} ≤ 0,
as ∑
k∈K1
η(k,1) = −
∑
k∈K2
η(k,1) = −θs=1 ≤ 0.
Therefore the sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 satisfies the second property stated in the axiom.
Finally,
n∑
i=1
log(p
k′i
s′i
/pkisi ) =
∑
(k,s))
η(k,s) = −γ < 0,
as η · A+ γ = 0. Hence
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
> 1.
The above proof assumes that the log of prices is rational. The proof of the theorem
follows along the same lines as Echenique and Saito (2013). Specifically, we have shown
the following
10 Lemma. If {(xk, pk)} is a dataset satisfying SARMU, in which log pk ∈ Q for all k,
then the dataset is maxmin rationalizable.
One can then prove the following
11 Lemma. If {(xk, pk)} is a dataset that satisfies SARMU, and > 0 then there is a
collection of prices {qk)} such that log qk ∈ Q+, pk − qk <, and the dataset {(xk, qk)}
satisfies SARMU.
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The proof of Lemma 11 is exactly as in Echenique and Saito (2013).
Lemma 10 establishes the result in datasets in which the log of prices is rational.
Consider an arbitrary data set {(xk, pk)}, with prices that may not be rational.
Suppose towards a contradiction that the dataset satisfies SARMU, but that it is not
maxmin rational. Specifically then, by Lemma 8, suppose that there is no solution to
the system A · x = 0, B · x ≥ 0 and E · x > 0. Then by Lemma 9 there are real vectors
η, θ and γ such that θ ≥ 0, γ > 0, and η · A+ θ ·B + γE = 0.
Let (qk)Kk=1 be vectors of prices such that the dataset (x
k, qk)Kk=1 satisfies SARMU and
log qks ∈ Q for all k and s. (Such (qk)Kk=1 exists by Lemma 11.) Furthermore, the prices
qk can be chosen arbitrarily close to pk. Construct matrices A′, B′, and E ′ from this
dataset in the same way as A, B, and E above. Note that only the prices are different in
{(xk, qk)} compared to {(xk, pk)}. So E ′ = E, B′ = B and A′i = Ai for i = 1, 2, 3. Since
only prices qk are different in this dataset, only A′4 may be different from A4.
By Lemma 11, we can choose prices qk such that |θ · A′4 − θ · A4| < γ/2. We have
shown that θ · A4 = −γ, so the choice of prices qk guarantees that θ · A′4 < 0. Let
γ′ = −θ · A′4 > 0.
Note that θ · A′i + η ·B′i + γ′Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. And B4 = 0 so
θ · A′4 + η ·B′4 + γ′E4 = θ · A′4 + γ′ = 0.
We also have that η ≥ 0 and γ′ > 0. Therefore θ, η, and γ′ exhibit a solution to the dual
system for dataset {(xk, qk)}, a contradiction with Lemma 10.
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